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Abstract—In a directional modulation network, a general
power iterative (GPI) based beamforming scheme is proposed to
maximize the secrecy rate (SR), where there are two optimization
variables required to be optimized. The first one is the useful
precoding vector of transmitting confidential messages to the
desired user while the second one is the artificial noise (AN)
projection matrix of forcing more AN to eavesdroppers. In such
a secure network, the paramount problem is how to design or
optimize the two optimization variables by different criteria. To
maximize the SR (Max-SR), an alternatively iterative structure
(AIS) is established between the AN projection matrix and the
precoding vector for confidential messages. To choose a good
initial value of iteration process of GPI, the proposed Max-SR
method can readily double its convergence speed compared to the
random choice of initial value. With only four iterations, it may
rapidly converge to its rate ceil. From simulation results, it follows
that the SR performance of the proposed AIS of GPI-based Max-
SR is much better than those of conventional leakage-based and
null-space projection methods in the medium and large signal-
to-noise ratio (SNR) regions, and its achievable SR performance
gain gradually increases as SNR increases.
Index Terms—Secrecy rate, artificial noise, directional modu-
lation, general power iterative, alternatively iterative structure.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the recent decade, physical-layer security in wireless
networks, as a new tool to provide an incremental safeguard
of confidential message over conventional cryptography, has
drawn tremendous research attention and interests from both
academia and industry [1]–[11]. In [1], the author’s seminal
research work has established the channel model and found
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the tradeoff curve between the transmission rate and the data
equivocation seen by the wire-tapper. More importantly, the
author also proved that reliable transmission at rates up to
C, is possible in approximately perfect secrecy. As a physical
layer secure transmit technique suitable for line-of-propagation
(LoP) scenario, directional modulation (DM) has made great
progresses in many aspects with the aid of artificial noise
(AN) and antenna array beamforming [12]–[19]. To enhance
security, the symbol-level precoder in [13] was presented by
using the concept of constructive interference in directional
modulation with the goal of reducing the energy consumption
at transmitter. In the presence of direction measurement error,
the authors in [17], [18] designed three new robust DM
synthesis methods for three different application scenarios:
single-desired user, multi-desired user broadcasting, multi-
desired user MIMO by fully making use of the property of di-
rection measurement error. Compared with conventional non-
robust methods, like null-space projection (NSP) [16], [20], the
proposed robust methods actually harvests an appealing rate
gain and almost an order-of-magnitude bit error rate (BER)
performance improvement along desired directions. The works
above only present an investigation on conventional DM with
only direction-dependent property. However, if eavesdropper
lies on the same direction from as the desired user, and its
distance from the DM transmitter is different from the distance
from the desired user to the DM transmitter, then it can still
intercept the confidential messages successfully. This is the
existing intrinsic secure problem for the conventional DM
networks. To address the serious secure issue, recently, the
authors in [21], [22] proposed an original concept of secure
and precise wireless transmission. In their works, the confiden-
tial messages are transmitted to the desired position precisely
and securely. If eavesdropper is outside the small area around
the desired position and locates in the same direction as the
desired direction, it can not intercept the confidential messages
successfully due to AN corruption and frequency random
property. However, in this paper, we focus still on how to
maximize the SR for conventional DM networks via GPI
algorithm.
However, in a three-node directional modulation network,
what is the maximum achievable secrecy rate in the absence of
direction estimation error? This is an open NP-hard problem.
In the following, we will solve the problem via a combination
of general power iterative (GPI) method [23] and alternatively
iterative structure (AIS). From simulation results, we find that
2the proposed GPI-based AIS can achieve an obvious secrecy
rate (SR) performance gain compared to conventional NSP and
leakage-based methods in the medium and large SNR regions.
Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
1) In line-of-sight (LoS) scenarios, such as mmWave com-
munications (massive MIMO), internet of things (IoT),
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and satellite commu-
nications, we propose a general power iterative (GPI)
scheme in DM system to maximize secrecy rate (SR),
which is shown to be much better than conventional NSP
and leakage-based methods in terms of SR.
2) To accelerate the convergence rate of our proposed
method, the leakage-based precoding vector and AN
projection matrix are chosen to be the initial values
instead of random generating. From simulation results, it
follows that the new initial values can greatly reduce the
number of iterations, and doubles the convergence rate
compared to the random ones. This means that a good
choice of initial values leads to a dramatic reduction in
computational amount of the proposed method.
The remainder is organized as follows: Section II describes
the system model. An AIS of maximizing secrecy rate (Max-
SR) based on GPI with aided AN is proposed in Section
III. Section IV presents the simulation results and complexity
analysis. Finally, we draw conclusions in Section V.
Notations: throughout the paper, matrices, vectors, and
scalars are denoted by letters of bold upper case, bold lower
case, and lower case, respectively. Signs (·)T , (·)∗ and (·)H
denote transpose, conjugate, and conjugate transpose, respec-
tively. Notation E{·} stands for the expectation operation.
Matrices IN denotes the N × N identity matrix and 0M×N
denotes M ×N matrix of all zeros. tr(·) denotes matrix trace.
Operation ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product of two matrices
[24].
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Fig. 1 sketches a diagram block of directional modulation
(DM) network consisting of one base station (BS, Alice)
equipped with N antennas, one desired node (Bob) and one
eavesdropping node (Eve). Here, it is assumed that both
desired node and eavesdropping node are employed with single
antenna and BS employs an N -element uniformly spaced
linear array. Due to its directional property, DM usually
works in LoP channel. By introducing the precoding vector of
confidential messages and AN projection matrix at transmitter,
the transmit baseband signal from antenna array of BS is of
the form
s = β1
√
Psvdx+ αβ2
√
PsPANz, (1)
where x is the confidential message with E
{
xHx
}
= 1
and z ∈ CN×1 denotes the AN vector of obeying complex
Gaussian distribution CN (0, IN−1). Ps denotes the total trans-
mit power, β1 and β2 stand for the power allocation (PA)
factors of confidential message and AN with β21 + β
2
2 = 1.
vd ∈ CN×1 denotes the transmit beamforming vector to align
the confidential message to desired direction, vHd vd = 1.
d( )qh e( )qh
Bob Eve
Alice
Fig. 1. Directional modulation network
PAN ∈ CN×(N−1) is the projection matrix, α normalizes
PANz such that α
2E{Tr[PANzzHPHAN ]} = 1.
After experiencing the LoP channel, the received signal
along direction θ is given by
y(θ) = hH(θ)s + nr
= β1
√
Psh
H(θ)vdx+ αβ2
√
Psh
H(θ)PANz+ nr,
(2)
where nr is additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with
nr ∼ CN (0, σ2r), h(θ) ∈ CN×1 is the normalized steer-
ing vector defined by h(θ) =
√
N−1[exp (j2piΨθ(1)) ,
· · · , exp (j2piΨθ(N))]T , and the phase function Ψθ(n)
along direction θ is denoted as Ψθ(n) , −[n − (N +
1)/2]d cos θλ−1, (n = 1, 2, · · · , N), where n indexes the
elements of transmit antenna array, d denotes the spacing of
two adjacent antennas, and λ is the wavelength of the carrier.
The receive signals at Bob and Eve are written as
y(θd) = β1
√
Psh
H(θd)vdx+ αβ2
√
Psh
H(θd)PANz+ nd,
(3)
and
y(θe) = β1
√
Psh
H(θe)vdx+ αβ2
√
Psh
H(θe)PANz+ ne,
(4)
where nd ∼ CN (0, σ2d) and ne ∼ CN (0, σ2e) represent the
noise at Bob and Eve. With the help of some classic estimation
algorithms such as Capon’s method, MUSIC and ESPRIT, the
DM transmitter in Fig. 1 can obtain the direction knowledge
of eavesdroppers and desired users. Without loss of generality,
it is assumed that the variances of σ2r , σ
2
d, and σ
e
r are equal,
i.e., σ2r = σ
2
d = σ
2
e = σ
2.
To derive the SR, the achievable rates of Bob and Eve,
R(θd) and R(θe) are defined as follows
R(θd) = log2
(
1 +
β21Psh
H(θd)vdv
H
d h(θd)
σ2d + α
2β22Psh
H(θd)PANPHANh(θd)
)
,
(5)
and
R(θe) = log2
(
1 +
β21Psh
H(θe)vdv
H
d h(θe)
σ2e + α
2β22Psh
H(θe)PANPHANh(θe)
)
,
(6)
Then, the SR Rs(vd,PAN ) is defined as follows
Rs(vd,PAN ) = max{0, R(θd)−R(θe)}
= max{0, log2
(
v
H
d (Hd +AdIN )vd
vHd (He +AeIN )vd
×B
)
},
(7)
3where Hd , hdh
H
d , He , heh
H
e ,
Ad = α
2β22β
−2
1 h
H(θd)PANP
H
ANh(θd) + σ
2(β21Ps)
−1, (8)
Ae = α
2β22β
−2
1 h
H(θe)PANP
H
ANh(θe) + σ
2(β21Ps)
−1, (9)
and
B =
h
H(θe)PANP
H
ANh(θe) + σ
2(α2β22Ps)
−1
hH(θd)PANPHANh(θd) + σ
2(α2β22Ps)
−1
. (10)
The RS defined in (7) should be larger than or equal to zero.
If it is less than zero, then the eavesdropper will get more
mutual information than the desired user. This is not desired
in a secure system. However, the second term on right hand
side of (7) can be less than zero sometimes, i.e.,
log2
(
v
H
d (Hd +AdIN )vd
vHd (He +AeIN )vd
×B
)
< 0 (11)
if the eavesdropper is closer to the DM transmitter than the
desired user. Thus, the operation max in RS given by (7)
should be kept such that the SR is larger than or equal to
zero. In what follows, we will maximize the SR by optimizing
the beamforming vector vd of confidential messages and the
projection matrix PAN of AN, which can be casted as
(P1) : max
vd,PAN
Rs(vd,PAN ) (12)
subject to vHd vd = 1,Tr[PANP
H
AN ] = α
−2.
Obviously, the above optimization problem is NP-hard, and
it is hard to be solved directly or find a closed-from solution
to the above problem.The objective function in (12) as shown
in (7) is divided into a sum of two non-convex functions of
variables vd, and PAN . This means that it is still a non-convex
function. Thus, we make a conclusion that the optimization
problem in (12) is a nonlinear non-convex optimization.
III. PROPOSED ITERATIVE ALGORITHM TO DESIGN
BEAMFORMING VECTOR vd AND PROJECTION MATRIX PAN
Since the joint optimization vd and PAN in (12) is too com-
plicated, we divided it into two mutual coupling subproblems
and construct an iterative structure between them. By fixing
the beamforming vector vd, the optimal PAN is solved by
utilizing the GPI algorithm [23]. For given projection matrix
PAN , the optimal vd is derived according to generalized
Rayleigh-Ritz ratio in [24]. This forms an alternatively iter-
ative structure. The Max-SR method outputs the beamforming
vector vd and projection matrix PAN by repeatedly applying
the GPI in [23].
A. Optimize PAN for fixed vd
If the beamforming vector vd in (12) is fixed, then the
optimization problem (12) can be reduced to
(P1.1) :max
PAN
Rs(fixed vd,PAN ) (13)
subject to Tr[PANP
H
AN ] = α
−2.
The cost function Rs(fixed vd,PAN ) is rewritten as
Rs = log2
(
Tr(PHANBdPAN )
Tr(PHANBePAN )
× Tr(P
H
ANCePAN )
Tr(PHANCdPAN )
)
= log2
(
w
H(IN−1 ⊗Bd)w
wH(IN−1 ⊗Be)w ×
w
H(IN−1 ⊗Ce)w
wH(IN−1 ⊗Cd)w
)
,
(14)
where w , vec(PAN ) ∈ CN(N−1)×1,
Bd =
β22
β21
Hd + (
σ2
β21Ps
+ hH(θd)vdv
H
d h(θd))IN , (15)
Be =
β22
β21
He + (
σ2
β21Ps
+ hH(θe)vdv
H
d h(θe))IN , (16)
Cd = Hd+ σ
2(β22Ps)
−1
IN , and Ce = He+ σ
2(β22Ps)
−1
IN .
Consider that shrinking or stretching PAN does not change
the ratio value as shown in (14), the problem (P1.1) is
equivalent to
(P1.2) :max
w
w
H(IN−1 ⊗Bd)w
wH(IN−1 ⊗Be)w ×
w
H(IN−1 ⊗Ce)w
wH(IN−1 ⊗Cd)w .
(17)
Since (17) is a non-convex quadratic fractional function,
(IN−1 ⊗Bd), (IN−1 ⊗Be), (IN−1 ⊗Cd) and (IN−1 ⊗Cd)
are N(N − 1)×N(N − 1) positive semi-definite matrices. w
can be solved by utilizing GPI algorithm in [23]. Then, PAN
is able to be reconstructed from w.
B. Optimize vd for fixed PAN
If the AN projection matrix PAN in (12) is fixed , the
optimization problem (12) is simplified to
(P1.3) : max
vd
Rs(vd, fixed PAN ) (18)
subject to vHd vd = 1
Observing (7), we find that above optimization problem is
equivalent to
(P1.4) : max
vd
v
H
d (Hd +AdIN )vd
vHd (He +AeIN )vd
(19)
subject to vHd vd = 1
Actually, this is a generalized Rayleigh-Ritz ratio problem
and the optimal vd is the eigenvector corresponding to the
largest eigenvalue of the matrix
(He +AeIN )
−1(Hd +AdIN ). (20)
C. Initialization of PAN and vd
Based on the two previous subsections, we propose an
AIS by alternatively solving PAN and vd to further improve
secrecy rate Rs as shown in Fig. 2. The basic idea is to
apply the two steps in Subsections A and B individually and
repeatedly until the SR converges. The detailed process is as
follows. Firstly, we take the initial values of PAN and vd
being the associated eigen-vectors of the largest egienvalues
of (23) and (25), respectively. Then, we compute PAN by
4utilizing GPI algorithm in [23] for a given fixed vd. Subse-
quently, vd is chosen to be the associated eigen-vectors of the
largest egienvalues of matrix(20) under the condition PAN is
fixed. We repeat the process until the termination condition is
satisfied.
    Projection  
    Matrix
Beamforming 
Vector
i
AN
P
i
d
v
AN
P dv
Fig. 2. Schematic diagram of AIS
Generally, the convergence rate of the iterative algorithm
in Fig. 2 depends intimately on the the initial value. In what
flows, we focus on the initialization of PAN and vd using the
leakage concept in accordance with (3) and (4).
From the aspect of interfering the eavesdropper, the AN
along direction θe should be viewed a useful component for
eavesdropper, and the leakage of AN to the desired direction
θd is regarded as interference. Hence, the AN-to-leakage-plus-
noise ratio (ANLNR) corresponding to PAN is defined as
ANLNR(PAN) =
α2β22Psh
H(θe)PANP
H
ANh(θe)
α2β22Psh
H(θd)PANPHANh(θd) + σ
2
=
Tr[PHANHePAN ]
Tr[PHAN (Hd +
σ2
β2
2
Ps
IN )PAN ]
. (21)
When maximizing the above cost function ANLNR(PAN),
the optimization variable PAN is a matrix. To solve this
problem, we convert matrix PAN into a column vector w
using vec operation, and the associated cost function becomes
ANLNR(w) =
w
H(IN−1 ⊗He)w
wH [IN−1 ⊗ (Hd + σ2β2
2
Ps
IN )]w
. (22)
Therefore, by maximizing the above objective function
ANLNR(w), we have the optimum w being the eigenvector
corresponding to the largest eigenvalues of matrix
[
IN−1 ⊗ (Hd + σ2(β22Ps)−1IN )
]
−1
(IN−1 ⊗He). (23)
This completes the initialization of PAN .
Similarly, as the desired user hopes that the confidential
message x should be leaked to the eavesdropper along the
eavesdropper direction θe as little as possible, we define
the confidential signal-to-leakage-plus-noise ratio (CSLNR)
corresponding to vd as
CSLNR(vd) =
β21Psv
H
d h(θd)h(θd)
H
vd
β21Psv
H
d h(θe)h(θe)
Hvd + σ2
=
v
H
d Hdvd
vHd (He +
σ2
β2
1
Ps
IN )vd
. (24)
Maximizing (24) yields the initial value of vd being the
eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalues of matrix
(He + σ
2(β21Ps)
−1
IN )
−1
Hd. (25)
: , ,
AN d s
ROutput P v
End
Compute  in (7) using and  i i i
s AN d
R P v
1| |i i
s s
R R d-- <
Update based on 20) (i
d
v
Solve by GPI algorithm in 3] [2i
AN
P
1
1
Compute the initial value of and 
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P
v
1 2: , , , , , ,  and 1d e ib b a d =Input h h
Begin
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Fig. 3. Flow graph of our proposed algorithm
Finally, the detailed implementation process of our proposed
AIS scheme is summarized in Algorithm 1.
In Algorithm 1, parameter δ is the tolerance factor. To make
the above algorithm more clear, the corresponding detailed
flow graph is also presented in Fig. 3.
IV. SIMULATION, DISCUSSION, AND COMPLEXITY
ANALYSIS
In this section, simulation results are presented to evaluate
the performance of the proposed algorithm. The leakage-
based method in [25] and NSP method in [20] are used For
comparison, . The system parameters are chosen as: N = 8,
PA factors β1 =
√
0.9 and β2 =
√
0.1, θd = 45
◦ and
θe = 70
◦, and QPSK.
A. Simulation results and analysis
Fig. 4 shows the achievable SR versus the number of
iterations between PAN and vd for leakage-based and random
5Algorithm 1 Proposed iterative algorithm to solve PAN and
vd
Input: hd, he, β1, β2, α and δ
Output: PAN , vd, Rs
Initialization: i = 1, and compute the initial value of P1AN
and v1d by using (23) and (25).
repeat
1. i = i+ 1.
2. Update PiAN utilizing GPI algorithm in [23];
3. Update vid based on (20);
4. Compute Ris in (7) using updated P
i
AN and v
i
d.
until |Ris −Ri−1s | < δ.
return PAN , vd and Rs.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Number of iterations
3.2
3.25
3.3
3.35
3.4
3.45
Se
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Leakage-based initialization
Random initialization
Fig. 4. Curves of achievable secrecy rate versus the number of iterations
(SNR=10dB)
initial values, respectively. Here, SNR is chosen to be 10dB. It
is seen that the iterative algorithm with leakage-based solution
as initialization value converges more rapidly than that with
random initialization. As shown in Fig. 4, the former converges
to a constant rate after 4 iterations, while the latter requires
7 iterations to converge. And the two initialization methods
finally converge to the same SR limit value. This implies that
the SLNR initialization can provide a faster convergence speed
than the random initialization .
Fig. 5 illustrates the achievable SR versus SNR of the
proposed method, leakage-based method in [25] and NSP
method in [20]. It can be seen that our proposed method
performs better than the remaining two methods in almost
all SNR regions. With the increase of SNR, the secrecy rate
gain over them achieved by the proposed method show a
gradual growth trend. For example, at SNR=15dB, the pro-
posed method attains an approximate ten-percent and twenty-
percent rate improvements over leakage and NSP methods,
respectively.
Fig. 6 plots the bit error rate (BER) versus SNR of the
proposed method, leakage-based method and NSP. All the
three methods achieve their best BER performance along the
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Fig. 5. Achievable secrecy rate versus SNR of three different methods
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Fig. 6. Curves of BER versus directional angles of three different methods
desired direction θd = 45
◦, and a sharp BER performance
degradation appears once the desired receiver deviates from the
main beam of the desired direction 45◦. Both NSP and our pro-
posed method have approximately the same BER performance
around the desired direction 45◦. The main reason is that the
proposed method reduces the effect of artificial noise on the
desired direction by maximizing SR. The NSP even makes
AN vanish in the desired direction. However, the conventional
NSP one shows a better BER performance than the proposed
method along the eavesdropper direction θe = 70
◦ , which
means that the confidential messages can be easily intercepted
along the direction.
B. Complexity comparison and convergence analysis
The complexities of the proposed Max-SR, NSP, and
leakage-based methods are O(I(N6)), O(N3), and O(N3)
floating-point operations (FLOPs), respectively, where I stands
for the number of iterations. Our proposed method is due to the
fact that the optimization variablew , vec(PAN ) in (13) is an
N(N−1)-D column vector. Clearly, the proposed method has
much higher complexity than NSP and leakage-based methods.
6Both NSP and leakage-based methods have the same order of
complexity.
For the aspect of convergence, we propose two different
choices of initial values in Section III: random and leakage-
based. From Fig. 4, the former requires 7 iterations to converge
the limit and the latter needs only 4 iterations. Clearly, the
leakage-based initialization approximately doubles the con-
vergence rate compared to the random initialization. This
means a good initial choice accelerates the convergence of
our proposed method.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated three beamforming
schemes including the proposed GPI-based Max-SR, leakage,
and NSP. Compared to the last two methods based on NSP and
leakage, the proposed GPI-based Max-SR method achieved a
substantial SR improvement in the medium and large SNR
regions. In particular, as SNR increases, the SR performance
gain increases. Additionally, by an appropriate choice of ini-
tialization value, for example, with the leakage-based solution
as initial value of GPI, the proposed method required only 4
iterations to converge to the limit value of SR. The random
initialization requires 7 iterations. Thus, the leakage-based
initialization saves about 40-percent computational amount
over random one. In the coming future, the proposed scheme
will be potentially applied to the following diverse applications
such as mmWave communications (massive MIMO), IoT,
UAV, satellite communications, and flying ad-hoc networks.
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